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GOVERNMENT BUDGETING 
Joanne Kelly and John Wanna 
Introduction 
 The ‘guardian-spender’ framework formulated by Aaron Wildavsky has defined the 
way in which most political scientists think about government budgeting since it first 
appeared in 1964 (Wildavsky 1975; Green and Thompson 1999). Wildavsky argued that 
budgetary outcomes could be explained (or at least analyzed) by focusing on the 
interplay of budget actors performing the highly stylized institutional roles of guardian 
(of the public purse) and spender. This behavioral framework proved sufficiently 
flexible to account for the differences in budgetary performance across different 
political systems (see studies by Savoie 1990; Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Wildavsky 
1986); as well as explaining the impact of budgetary reform and divergent economic 
environments on budget politics (Caiden and Wildavsky 1974; Wildavsky 1975). 
Reference to ‘guardians’ and ‘spenders’ still pervades discussions of government 
budgeting in the academic literature of political science and economics (Campos and 
Pradhan 1997), and has become accepted as conventional descriptions by practitioners 
in national governments and international bodies (such as the OECD, World Bank and 
the IMF). 
This article applies Wildavsky’s guardian-spender framework to analyze the impact of 
New Public Management (NPM) reforms on budgetary politics, and to test the 
framework’s continued explanatory value. It is widely held that NPM reforms are 
explicitly designed to transform the existing norms, rules, process and objectives of 
budgetary and financial management (NZ Treasury 1987; Hood 1991; Boston et al. 
1991; Pollitt 1993; OECD 1995; Thompson 1998). We want to study how these reforms 
are likely to impact on the balance of power between guardians and spenders in a given 
budgetary setting. This initial study focuses on three widely recurring themes that typify 
the NPM budgetary and financial reform agenda: reformulated budgetary objectives and 
culture, centralized aggregate expenditure controls, and devolved financial 
management. In pursuing these reforms, NPM seeks to establish new budget 
conventions that are based on principal-agent relationships, outcome-based accrual 
accounting and budgeting techniques, and contract-price budgeting (variously called 
competitive tendering). We ask whether these NPM reforms re-model or transform 
budgetary systems to such an extent that the guardian-spender framework has declined 
in explanatory value. 
Our analysis proceeds in four sections. The first re-examines central elements of 
Wildavsky’s model of budgetary politics focusing specifically on the guardian-spender 
dichotomy, tools and strategies of the ‘budget game’ and the impact of budgetary 
reform. Next we identify the main categories of budget and financial management 
reforms introduced under NPM (OECD 1995:94-197; 1998). The third section of this 
article examines the impact of these reforms on budgetary politics; specifically, on 
institutional roles and functions; on the tools and strategies available to both sets of 
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budget actors; and on the balance of power within a budgetary system. Finally, we 
conclude by posing questions on the continued sustainability of the guardian-spender 
framework given new problems posed by changes in the budgetary environment (such 
as the recent arrival of surplus budgets and the political difficulties associated with 
managing surpluses while maintaining fiscal restraint). 
The conclusion of the analysis suggests that where NPM reforms have been extensively 
adopted and far-reaching they alter the terrain of budgetary systems, establishing more 
complex budgetary arrangements than suggested by the guardian-spender model. NPM 
reforms tend to change budgetary behaviors and, in doing so, alter the balance of power 
in favor of guardians. The reforms also change the budgetary role of spenders as budget 
actors. Hence, the traditional dichotomy between rationing guardians and maximising 
spenders is difficult to sustain as more complex budgetary relationships emerge that do 
not accord with the guardian-spender model. Furthermore, NPM reforms also have the 
potential to shift both the locus of budgetary conflict and the areas of agreement. 
Budgetary relationships are likely to become more fragmented, more uncertain and less 
routine if contractual service deliverers are included in the process. Conflict is likely to 
be dissipated away from central budget agencies with spenders assuming guardian roles 
over resources they themselves may chose to deploy in purchasing contractual services 
from other actors. The advent of multi-year budgets (providing 2 or 3 year 
authorizations) also has the potential to contain budgetary conflicts. Finally, we ask 
whether the ‘transformations’ to budgetary systems under NPM are likely to require 
further amendment as governments regularly have to manage budget surpluses. 
Strategies and Tools of Budget Politics 
In The Politics of the Budgetary Process Aaron Wildavsky established new methods of 
inquiry into the processes of government budgeting (Jones and McCaffery 1994). 
Rather than proceeding from a normative basis that sought to pronounce how 
governments should budget, Wildavsky focused on explaining ‘how the budgetary 
process actually works’ (1974). He revealed the highly competitive but uncertain nature 
of budgetary formulation, the inherent complexity of budgetary decisions, and how 
budget actors need to specialize, ‘satisfice’ and rely on ‘decisional heuristics’ to contain 
conflict. Behavioral norms tended to characterise government budgeting in the absence 
of formal procedures for financial control. In other words, Wildavsky constructed a 
framework for studying the politics of government budgeting which highlighted three 
primary elements of budgetary politics: 
• the dichotomous relations between guardians and spenders became 
pronounced in the absence of formal rules and procedures of financial control;  
• actor strategies and practices provided some sort of ‘routine’ to budgetary 
politics; and  
• the impact of reform on budget politics tended to be limited.  
Government budgetary politics are depicted as a game between two sets of actors 
playing the institutional roles of guardians and spenders.
1
 Wildavsky classified 
budgetary players according to loosely defined and highly stylized criteria based on ‘the 
expectation of behavior attached to institutional positions’ (1975:11). These roles are 
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performed at each stage of the budget process and at all levels of the political and 
bureaucratic spheres. Wildavsky summarized his argument as follows: 
One of the constants of budgeting is the division of roles into spenders and savers, 
a result of the universal scarcity of resources. Claims and demands always 
outweigh the resources to satisfy them. Hence there are always people who want 
more than they have and those who show them they can’t have as much as they 
would like. Officials in charge of carrying out the government’s functions are 
oriented toward needs. They are always confronted with things that are not done 
but should be done. They fulfil their task best by advocating these needs. For this 
reason the government’s purse needs guardians who would ensure spending does 
not go beyond available resources and that all spending advocates get a share of 
what is available (Wildavsky 1975:187). 
While Wildavsky recognized the dichotomy between spenders and guardians resulted in 
adversarial conflict, he did not define this conflict as problematic. Successful budgeting 
is portrayed as a product of ongoing guardian and spender relations: both roles are 
legitimate and necessary in resolving budget decisions. Dividing functions and 
responsibilities between spenders and guardians enables specialization, increases 
predictability and, therefore, reduces complexity in budget decision-making. Programs 
are generated by those with expert knowledge; expenditure and revenue limits are set by 
those responsible for the government’s economic and fiscal performance. Interaction 
between the two sides forces compromise and requires both sides to justify and defend 
their position: specialization and institutional conflict between spenders and guardians 
produces better budgets. 
Second, guardians and spenders employ an array of strategies, practices and processes 
to further their objectives in budgetary negotiations and these ‘techniques of 
competition’ are knowable. All budgetary systems provide actors with limited options, 
and in response they devise a set of strategies and practices used to play the ‘budget 
game’. In attempting to ‘protect the public purse’ against the spenders, guardians may 
draw on their legislative and administrative authority, attempt to exercise ‘moral’ 
suasion, or manage budget decision-making processes. Guardians in parliament or 
congress have the legal authority to reduce or simply deny the funding requested of a 
particular agency. Central budget agencies adapt the systems of financial accountability 
to control expenditures. Guardian ministers may threaten to increase tax levels or 
impose across the board cuts. They often will seek agreement on expenditure targets or 
rationing strategies before proceeding with more detailed budget negotiations. 
For their part, the spenders draw on their position as policy or program experts to 
legitimize claims to protect existing expenditure, increase their relative share of public 
expenditure, or add new programs and expand existing ones. Not only do spenders need 
to produce ‘good work’ and ‘play it straight’, but they should be able to recognize and 
exploit available opportunities at the appropriate time. Policy expertise is based on 
relations with the program clientele or service delivery knowledge, yet spenders must be 
careful not to project the image of being ‘captured’ by those clients. In protecting their 
on-going base, spenders may threaten to burn the ‘Washington Monument’. Both sets of 
actors seek to exert political influence for their desired position by garnering 
congressional or ministerial support, by mobilizing interest groups or influential 
staffers. 
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Yet, budgeting is not a ‘free-for-all fight’ between guardians and spenders: budget 
actors cooperate as well as compete. The complexity of budget decision-making 
requires areas of stability and techniques of conflict limitation or confinement. For 
example, in determining how much additional funding to request or how much funding 
to grant, budget actors rely on various ‘aids to calculation’. Under the system described 
by Wildavsky, both parties rely on past experience as a guide either to the reliability of 
a department’s claims or the likelihood of spending being approved. They simplify the 
issues under consideration by limiting the focus of discussion to inputs rather than 
policy, or excluding certain agreed tracts of expenditure – such as those included in ‘the 
base’ or the non-discretionary expenditures - from budget negotiations. As a result, 
budget decision-makers tend to ‘satisfice’ rather than comprehensively review each and 
every possible option. The increment method of budgeting implies regular, annual 
expenditure changes (typically increases) across all expenditure areas in each 
department. Spenders know they will get a ‘fair share’ increase, guardians know that 
increases will not be too high. Losses in one year can be gained in another; problems in 
one year can be deferred until the next. Wildavsky concludes: ‘the men who make the 
budget are concerned with relatively small increments to an existing base. Their 
attention is focused on a small number of items over which the budgetary battle is 
fought’ (1974:15). 
Third, budgetary reform is likely to upset the balance of power between guardians and 
spenders, and so affect budget outcomes. This is because the actual strategies available 
to budget actors vary according to the political, economic and budgetary system within 
which the budget ‘game’ proceeds. The balance of power over time is largely dependent 
on the extent to which guardians vis-à-vis spenders are able to take advantage of these 
strategies. Under stable institutional, political and economic conditions, the game of 
budget politics becomes routine: each player knows what to expect from the other and 
‘participants have counter-roles that necessitate a strong push from the departmental 
side’ (Wildavsky 1974:19). Budgetary reform upsets this balance and previously agreed 
areas of budget politics become highly contested. This is one of the major reasons why 
budgetary reform is highly political, threatening and hotly contested. 
It is within this context that we analyze the budgetary reforms introduced under the 
auspices of NPM. The principal reforms associated with NPM were often designed 
precisely to change the way public resources were allocated and were managed. As such 
NPM has attempted to reconstruct many of the traditional ‘tools of budgetary politics’. 
To the extent it is successful in this regard NPM is likely to impact on the roles and 
capacities of the major budgetary actors. The remaining sections of this article present a 
preliminary study of what NPM seeks to achieve in budget reform; what the basic 
paradigm defines as ‘good’ budget practice; how these new budget and resource 
management practices impact on guardians and spenders; and how NPM reforms impact 
on budget conflict. 
NPM and the Vision of ‚Better Budgeting‘ 
The central core of NPM reforms has to date been directed toward reconstructing the 
nature of public provision mainly using improved resourcing and financial management. 
By the mid-1970s, much had been written about the problems of traditional line-item 
budgeting (Wilenski 1986:225). Studies of both the American and British budgeting 
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systems suggested classical budgetary processes favored spenders over guardians, and 
were the cause of ever increasing taxes, debt and deficits. These criticisms were echoed 
by commissions of inquiry into traditional systems of public administration established 
by governments around the globe. These included the Glassco (1962) and Lambert 
commissions (1976-9) in Canada, the Coombs (1974-6) and Reid (1982-3) reports in 
Australia, and Reagan’s Grace commission established in 1982. In the UK, Thatcher 
established the Efficiency Scrutiny Unit in the early 1980s to conduct regular 
‘scrutinies’ of the efficiency and economy in departmental administration. Each of these 
investigations presented a litany of complaints against traditional budgetary systems and 
the outmoded financial techniques used within government. They recommending 
instead the adoption of far-reaching reforms typically directed toward ‘letting the 
managers manage’ – encouraging managerial flexibility within a framework of defined 
objectives, tight resource controls and performance monitoring. 
Yet, each inquiry advocated various forms of budgetary and financial management 
reform, and many of their detailed recommendations appeared to be contradictory. On 
the one hand, critics argued that the traditional budget provided guardians with 
insufficient authority or incentive to limit claims for increased spending by line 
departments. Central agencies appeared largely incapable of overcoming the 
incremental bias inherent in the traditional budgetary process, and lacked the incentives 
that would encourage them to find new ways of doing so. If governments were to limit 
their size and the growth of public expenditure then reforms were needed that 
strengthened the position of budget guardians. On the other hand, traditional budget 
rules and financial controls were criticized as being too restrictive and control-oriented 
to facilitate efficient and effective financial management (see Schick 1994; 1997). 
Budgetary processes were oriented toward measuring inputs, encouraging 
administrators to focus on probity rules and ‘bean-counting’ rather than on results, 
efficiency or the effectiveness of government programs. According to NPM reformers, 
new budgetary systems should be designed to provide flexibility and increase the 
responsibility of ‘empowered managers’ in both rationing resources and operating 
within those limits (Dawkins 1983:3). 
To a large extent these contradictions stemmed from differences between new 
institutional economics (NIE) and ‘managerialism’ – the primary intellectual frames of 
reference informing these analyses (Aucoin 1990; Hood 1991; Pollitt 1993; Hughes 
1994; Keraudren and van Mierlo 1998:39). New institutional economists applying their 
ideas to the public sector identified ‘perverse’ behavior in traditional budget institutions 
causing inefficiency at both the aggregate and departmental levels (for detailed review 
see Thompson 1998). Traditional budgets aggregated the individual choices of self-
interested budget actors. This produced ‘sub-optimal’ expenditure decisions (that result 
in higher than optimal expenditure levels, and unwanted deficits and debt) because the 
costs of increasing government programs can be externalized in a system in which 
revenues are generated from broad-based taxation and distributed through consolidated 
revenue funds. In other words, the beneficiaries of government programs do not bear the 
full taxation or political costs of expenditure increases. Benefits are likely to be 
concentrated while the costs will be defrayed amongst the tax paying population. 
Further, government program ‘costing’ systems paid little attention to the transaction or 
agency costs of conducting internal government business or delivering services. Thus, 
in NIE the collective actions of individual budget actors behaving rationally in the 
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budget process will result in total expenditure levels higher than that posited as the 
optimal collective outcome. 
In response, NIE promoted institutional reform to establish different incentive patterns 
in the management of government resources. Budgetary reforms, they argued, should 
establish rules and institutions that promote ‘collectively rational’ objectives to be 
articulated and pursued in budgetary formulation. To that end, total expenditure levels 
should be centrally determined and then used to discipline subsequent budget 
negotiations (von Hagen 1992; Alesina and Perrotti 1997). Such determinations are 
difficult under the collegial decision-making systems that characterised the traditional 
budgetary processes and so should be replaced by high-level hierarchical decision-
making. Financial management reforms should redesign the incentive structures to align 
the self-interest of managers with collective intentions. Instituting competitive, market-
based service delivery and pricing techniques can lower service delivery costs. And the 
insistence on the distinction between the operational and policy functions of 
government (principal-agent/purchaser-provider split) reduces the transactional costs 
associated with departmental rent-seeking and capture (New Zealand Treasury 1987: 
44-8,72-95). 
By contrast, managerialism identified the existing rules and practices of public 
administration as a source of government inefficiency (Pollitt 1993). It was argued that 
the ethos of traditional public administration emphasised probity and compliance over 
efficiency and economy. As a consequence, bureaucrats in both spending and guardian 
agencies ‘administered’ rules and regulations, rather than ‘managed’ their program and 
policy resources. Managerialism proposed that these problems could be resolved by 
adopting private sector management techniques, and improving the quality, status and 
accountability of operational management. Responsibility for detailed budgeting and 
financial management should be devolved to those responsible for delivering 
government programs. Detailed lines of input-based appropriations should be replaced 
by broadband appropriations defined by program objectives. Closely associated with the 
devolution of authority is risk management and deregulation of financial management 
techniques and processes based control systems. Line managers should be free of 
‘pettifogging rules or constraints’ (Pollitt 1997:467) and therefore able to transfer 
resources as they see fit. Rules about the modes of service delivery should also be 
decreased to allow programs managers the fullest discretion in achieving ‘more for 
less’. Program objectives should be clearly articulated, linkages made between program 
evaluation and budgetary allocations. In sum, reforms seek to construct a public sector 
in which ‘managers are not limited, as in the line-item budget, to expenditures on a 
particular input but can, as circumstances change, judge the correct mix of resources or 
inputs which will best promote the success of the program’ (Wilenski 1986: 231). 
Governments in the OECD variously adopted these recommendations. Three main 
categories of reform were introduced: reformulating the budgetary environment; 
centralising aggregate expenditure controls and devolving responsibility for detailed 
resource management (OECD 1995; 1997). Each can be justified by either of the 
frameworks underpinning the NPM paradigm. Reformulating the budgetary 
environment redirects the self-interest of bureaucrats and politicians, and provides 
managers with clear objectives within which to direct their attention. Centralized 
aggregate expenditure controls provide managers with a stable planning environment, 
and a means of limiting consumption of public resources. Devolving responsibility for 
  
International Public Management Review · electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 1 · Issue 1 · 2000 · © International Public Management Network 
39 
 
detailed resource management increases managerial flexibility and forces managers to 
assume responsibility for their government expenditures (and thereby internalize the 
costs of public expenditure). In the following section we explore both the expected and 
unanticipated impacts of these categories of reform on the role and the capacity of 
spenders and guardians in the budgetary process. 
Before proceeding with this analysis, it is important to recognize variation and the 
continuing evolution of NPM reform agendas in different countries (Aucoin, 1990; 
Forster and Wanna, 1990; Hood, 1994; Kettle, 1997; Pallott, 1998; Peters and Savoie, 
1998; Verheijen and Coombes, 1998). Comparative and individual country studies 
illustrate considerable variation in the extent to which these two theoretical frameworks 
inform NPM. By way of brief summary, Table 1 identifies some of the foremost 
statements and articulations of NPM in the five Anglo-American countries and (drawing 
on existing literature) notes which of the NPM ‘partners’ dominant the reform agenda in 
each country. In many instances, the theoretical underpinning remained implicit. New 
Zealand’s self-identification with NIE is the exception (NZ Treasury 1987; Boston 
1993). There is, of course, much overlap between the two frameworks, and this simple 
classification ignores the processes of cross-national learning and iteration by which the 
NPM paradigm evolved (for examples see Canadian Auditor General 1995; Nagel 
1997). Nonetheless, these differences highlight an important qualification to the 
arguments presented below: the impact of NPM on budgetary politics will vary across 
countries. The following sections should be read with that qualification in mind. 
 
Table 1: Selected Markers and Manifestos of NPM 
Country Manifesto(s) and ‘Markers’ (Year) Dominant influence 
UK Rayner Scrutinies 1979; Financial Management 
Improvement (1982 CMND 9058, 1983); 
Improving Management in Government: the 
Next Steps (Efficiency Unit 1988).  
Managerialism (Kemp 
1990; Hood 1991; Pollitt 
1993). 
 Modernizing Government (1998). Co-ordinated – joined up 
government. 
Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration (1976); The ‘Reid Report’ 
(1983); Reforming the Australian Public 
Service (1983); FMIP (1984); Budget Reform 
(1984); The Australian Public Sector Reformed 
(1992).  
Managerialism (Keating 
1989; Hood 1991; Corbett 
1992; Davis et al 1999). 
Australia 
Beyond Bean-Counting: Effective Financial 
Management in the APS 1998 & Beyond 
(1997); Clarifying the Exchange: A Review of 
Purchaser/Provider Arrangements. National 
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Economic Management (1984); Statement of 
Government Expenditure Review (1986); 
Government Management: Brief to the 
Incoming Government 1987 (1987); 
New Institutional 
Economics – esp. Public 
Choice Theory (Boston et 
al 1991:2-26; Pallot 1997).  
USA President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost 
Control (Grace Committee 1982) 
Reinventing Government (1992);  
National Performance Review (1993) 
Managerialism (Pollitt 
1993; Kettl 1997; 
Thompson 1998; 
Fredrickson 1996). 
Canada Auditor General’s report on Financial 
Management (1978);  
Royal Commission on Financial Management 
& Accountability’ – The ‘Lambert’ Report 
(1979); Increased Ministerial Authority & 
Accountability (1988); Public Service 2000 
(1992). 
Managerialism (Aucoin 
1990; Peters and Savoie 
1998). 
 Getting Government Right (1995); Modern 
Comptrollership; Breaking Barriers in the 
Federal Public Service (199) Toward Better 
Governance: Public Service Reform in New 





Reformulated Budgetary Objectives and Culture 
One of the driving forces behind the NPM agenda is an effort to change the objectives 
and culture of government budgeting. The emergence of NPM in most countries during 
the early 1980s coincided with the beginning of an era emphasizing fiscal restraint and 
rectitude. Most of the NPM ‘manifestos and markers’ identified in the above chart, 
present financial management reforms as a solution to problems of public sector 
inefficiency, an overly large public sector, unsustainable levels of government debt or 
all three. The traditional budget, it is claimed, contributed to ever increasing 
government expenditures by emphasizing planning rather than restraint and its reliance 
on incremental decision-making. Similarly, the control based financial management 
systems were designed to ensure probity in government spending and often hindered the 
pursuit of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in service delivery. In contrast, NPM 
reforms sought to establish the values of economy and parsimony (Hood, 1991); 
encourage mangers to ‘do more with less’; to ‘restrain leviathan’; and offered a way of 
‘preventing the public sector from claiming an ever-increasing share of national 
resources’ (OECD, 1995:94). In other words, NPM reforms seek to introduce a cultural 
change that emphasizes the objectives typically associated with guardianship over those 
of spending. 
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This change in emphasis affects budgetary politics at a number of different levels. First, 
it de-legitimized debate over how to spend government money by emphasizing the 
importance of expenditure cuts and restraint. The emphasis of budget debate turned 
away from policy development to questions of ‘the bottom line’ financial results. In 
doing so it reduced the legitimacy of spenders in budget reformulation networks. 
Second, it provided guardians with additional strategies in budgetary debates: 
arguments. Third it limited spenders capacity to argue for their ‘fair-share’ of 
expenditure growth. In a climate expenditure growth, spenders could present claims for 
increased expenditure based on principles of ‘reciprocity’ and public demand. In the 
climate of restraint, spenders making these assertions risked being labeled ‘rent-seekers’ 
or the captive agents of vested interests. Fourth, demands for collective expenditure 
restraint require spenders to assume some of the responsibility for identifying possible 
areas for expenditure cuts and restraint. Budget actors in spending institutions were 
required to ‘ration’ and ‘save’ instead of functioning exclusively as claimants. Finally, 
these new budgetary objectives established an environment receptive to further reform 
directed toward expenditure restraint. It strengthened guardians’ position to shape and 
design on-going reforms to the system of government budgeting and financial 
management. 
Budgetary Politics under centralized Expediture Controls 
In 1995 the OECD reported that most member countries had established some type of 
centralised control over aggregate expenditure levels (OECD 1995:95). Although this 
report focuses primarily on highly visible statements of budgetary targets, aggregate 
expenditure controls range from statements of ‘high-level budgetary targets’; more 
specific annual policy or portfolio specific expenditure targets and limits; to the 
adoption of cash limited multiple year agency budgets. As well as varying in the level 
of detail, these statements also vary in intent. Some are directed toward planning the 
rate of growth in government expenditures (examples of these planning totals were 
undertaken in Canada (PEMS) and the UK (PESC) (Wright 1980)); others seek to 
introduce a trend toward expenditure restraint; while others are the starting point for 
internal budget negotiations. These types of statements impact directly and indirectly on 
the relationships between guardians and spenders and their budgetary roles. 
Public statements of budgetary objectives – especially those with specific multi-year 
expenditure limits – restrict both the extent to which either spenders and guardians can 
set the budget agenda. On the one hand, it limits capacity to argue for higher 
expenditure levels, or the ability to increase total spending levels through bottom-up, 
additive processes. But a statement of budgetary targets can also limit the flexibility of 
guardians to set overall budgetary parameters, and also limit the capacity to respond to 
short term demands whether economic or political. Experience to date suggests that 
many of the high-level statements of budgetary objectives are set outside the formal 
budgetary process (during election campaigns for example). In these instances the 
primary objective of budgetary negotiations is to determine how to achieve and stay 
within these pre-stated targets, rather than establishing the expenditure targets that 
should be achieved. 
Delivering the expenditure targets stated in these documents requires changes in both 
budget organization and procedure. Budget timetables are redesigned to ensure 
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decisions on annual expenditure aggregates and priorities are set before decisions on 
allocation commence. In some countries these specific portfolio targets and limits are 
decided by a very small number of guardian ministers and officials, and deliberately 
exclude any participation by spenders. Often these reforms are accompanied by 
limitations (or indeed the abolition) of the annual bidding process over expenditure on 
continuing programs (Australia’s rolling forward estimates and the British PESC). 
‘Baseline’ expenditures are determined automatically and responsibility for allocating 
any additional expenditure is devolved to senior representatives of the spending 
departments (ministers, departmental heads, and senior finance officers). These reforms 
seek to exclude spenders’ from the debates over budget aggregates and thereby increase 
the authority of guardians. 
The establishment of aggregate expenditure controls provides guardian(s) with an 
external reference point to restrict the expansionary endeavors of spending agencies, 
and to guide work within the budget agency. A former head of the Australian 
Department of Finance once stated ‘there is nothing that Finance or Treasury loves 
more than publicly stated expenditure limits, it provides a stick with which they can 
thrash the spending departments in budget negotiations’ (interview Keating, 1998). The 
promotion of a corporate budget ethos across the public service reduces the efficacy of 
spenders’ arguments based on their position as advocates of particular interest groups. 
Such arguments are likely to result in an accusation of ‘rent-seeking’ rather than 
enhance the validity of spending claims. In addition, clear statements of when and why 
expenditures have risen or targets not been met, enable an interested public to allocate 
blame to ‘spoilers’. These processes are more likely to locate the political costs of 
expenditure increases with spenders rather than guardians. 
In sum, articulating and developing centralized aggregate expenditure controls typically 
require the introduction of hierarchical or top-down budgetary processes, that change 
the position and functions of both guardians and spenders. Many of these reforms 
deliberately reduce the access of spenders to decision-making on expenditure aggregates 
and budget formulation. In terms of the more detailed expenditure decisions, spenders 
are required to perform a rationing function over the expenditures for which they are 
responsible. At the same time, these reforms increase the strategies and tools available 
to guardians in controlling claims on the public purse, but require them to engage in 
quite different budgetary activities. Guardians focus on ensuring bottom-line targets are 
delivered, rather than on engaging in bidding negotiations with spenders over detailed 
expenditure levels and policy decisions. 
Budgetary Politics in a flexible Resource Management Regime 
NPM reforms designed to increase managerial flexibility focus on two primary themes: 
devolving financial management, and introducing new modes of service delivery. The 
first increases flexibility to manage a given resource base even within traditional 
departmental structures. It aims to make public sector service delivery more efficient by 
reducing ‘inefficient’ rules and regulations that limit managerial capacity to improve 
resource management. The second set of reforms extend the notion of ‘managerial 
flexibility’ by challenging traditional notions of governance in which departments are 
exclusive provider of public services. This new mode of governance is based on the 
implementation of a purchaser-provider split and market-based price-costing methods 
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(Ewart and Boston 1993). Rather than rely on the advice of internal service providers, 
governments seek to determine the lowest ‘purchase price’ of service delivery through 
competitive tendering, market-testing, full cost accounting systems. The government 
then enters into a formal contractual relationship with either private or public sector 
providers to deliver the desired provision at a given price. In theory, this enables 
government to achieve lower prices, avoid client capture and reduce transaction costs. 
Whilst public sector providers may ‘win’ government contracts they should operate as 
commercial units reconstituted on a profit motive (see work on agencification by Pollitt 
1999) and ‘hived-off’ from the parent department. Under this model, a government 
‘department’ consists of a core group of policy and contract managers. The adoption of 
either model of ‘flexible’ management significantly changes the role of and relationship 
between spenders and guardians. 
Devolution of financial management removes some traditional tools of guardianship, 
while at the same time demanding that spenders assume responsibility for ‘rationing’ 
public resources – a function traditionally associated with guardianship. The capacity of 
central budget agencies to impose detailed financial controls over departmental 
expenditures stood as the primary tool of traditional guardianship. Claims that these 
controls were illusionary are probably justifiable, especially as they did not assist 
resource management (Wilenski 1986: 231). Nonetheless, traditional central controls 
allowed guardians to limit the uses and directions of public money and guide the flow of 
public spending in the economy. Under devolved systems of financial management 
guardians are not devoid of strategies of budgetary control (and could always reclaim 
some detailed controls should they wish). Rather, their preferred tools are directed 
toward questions of aggregate expenditure control, and therefore constitute a shift in the 
focus of guardian-spender budgetary politics away from controls over how agencies 
spend money. 
Further, the devolution of financial management imposes a responsibility on spenders 
themselves to perform rationing functions. Wildavsky showed that under the traditional 
budgetary system spenders and guardians performed specialized functions, and that one 
set of actors could ‘push’ because the other would ‘push back’. In contrast, the financial 
management system envisaged by NPM reduces the degree of specialization in 
budgetary functions and the countervailing forces in budget negotiations. Program 
managers, departmental heads and line ministers – those budget actors traditionally 
classified as spenders – are required to perform the guardianship function within their 
own areas of financial responsibility (whether classified as envelopes, portfolios, 
programs, or product-centres for example). Under the traditional model, spenders made 
demands to guardians or sought to protect their programs from imminent cuts. In a 
devolved budgetary system, spending agencies must assume responsibility for 
allocating available funding to new and on-going policies, identifying areas of 
expenditure restraint and reallocating existing funds. Under this system, budgetary 
conflict is localized in specific expenditure areas, and played out between a group of 
actors that would traditionally be classified as spenders.  
The introduction of new modes of service delivery has the potential to undermine the 
institutional basis upon which spenders are defined. The logic defining their behavior in 
Wildavsky’s model (and their value and legitimacy in budgetary negotiations), rests 
largely on their role as advocates and experts in particular policy areas. Information 
exchanged between policy and operational sectors in the spending departments 
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produced detailed policy expertise that was unavailable to the budget agencies at the 
centre of government. In addition, service deliverers operated at the nexus between 
government and the public, and as such acted as a conduit providing vital feedback into 
the policy debates. By removing the service delivery functions from spending 
departments, NPM reforms devalue ‘arguments from expertise’ by the remaining 
department. The delivery of public services by non-government organizations means 
policy expertise derived from service delivery will be outside the government and 
therefore excluded from higher-level budgetary considerations. 
Moreover, to the extent that budgetary reforms under NPM have formalized procedures 
for financial control, they reduce the scope for actor behavior to construct ways of 
routinizing bargaining relations between themselves. Increased formalization and 
transparency does not entirely do away with relational politics but restricts opportunities 
for bargaining. Accrual schedules, for instance, will project consistent depreciation 
costs up to ten years out and indicate long-term liabilities for which agencies are 
required to make provision. Spending agencies will often now know years ahead of time 
their firm allocative estimates of expenses and have little opportunity to augment these 
amounts – and be expected to incorporate new policy initiatives within their existing 
allocations. They enjoy flexibility to move resources to areas of highest priority or need, 
and do not need to gain central budgetary approval to re-deploy their resources. Of 
course, spenders could decide or allow themselves to become maverick and not comply 
with these formal requirements. In such circumstances authorization to operate with 
devolved discretion is likely to be removed or severely curtailed (losing the agency 
many internal benefits), or additional other penalties may be imposed on recalcitrant 
agencies (e.g., additional levies if running in ‘debt’ or any ‘over-spending’ may be 
deducted from their next year’s estimates – as a ‘borrowing’). One indication of the 
changed logic of rationing is that spending agencies that manage to declare a ‘dividend’ 
back to the government (a departmental surplus over their costs) are often most likely to 
be rewarded with carriage of new policy initiatives being considered by government. 
Paradoxically, the best rationers may be the agencies that have most growth potential. 
Reforms directed toward establishing a split between the policy and operational 
functions of government complicate budgetary politics even further by introducing the 
potential for a three-way budgetary relationship. Central agencies act as principal; line 
departments become policy agents, and the organization contracted to provide 
government services becomes the delivery agent. Moreover, on some programs some 
multiple policy agents may be involved with hundreds of delivery agents. This clearly 
does not accord with the simple dichotomy suggested in the guardian-spender model. 
Increasing the number of service providers fragments the budget process: it is likely to 
result in more bi-lateral negotiations and temporary relationships. This is especially 
problematic if service providers are included in budgetary processes. One of the 
conveniences of the previous system was that one or two guardians dealt with a 
constant, and relatively small group of spenders. This environment fostered the 
enduring relationships and ‘decisional heuristics’ referred to by Wildavsky. In the more 
complex and fragmented environment of NPM, these tools of budget decision making 
will become more difficult to develop and less reliable. 
Decisions about who will bear responsibility for renegotiating service delivery contracts 
have a direct bearing on budgetary politics. Will the central or policy agencies 
renegotiate contracts? Will the funding levels for these contracts be renegotiated 
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between central and policy agencies, or between the policy agent and the service 
deliver? How will prices be set and what benchmarks be used? If central agencies 
assume the role of ‘strategic investor’ then they bear responsibility for both generating 
claims on the public purse (as investor/purchaser) and rationing the available resources 
between those claims (as guardian) – in other words, they perform both the rationing 
and claiming functions. While these two functions are not necessarily contradictory, 
they do fall outside the simple classification system offered in the guardian-spender 
model. If the policy agents remaining in the spending departments assume responsibility 
for renegotiating contracts, will they behave as guardians of the public purse or 
advocates for their policy and program recipients? While we can venture answers to 
these questions on the basis of theory, much more research and is needed to learn the 
lessons of practical experience. 
Assessing the Impact of NPM on Budgetary Politics 
The overall thrust of NPM reforms strengthens the position of guardians in budgetary 
politics. Some reforms remove the traditional tools of guardianship – tight controls over 
detailed inputs, for example, but in general, they are replaced by a broader set of 
strategies that expand the tool-kit of guardians, especially in terms of aggregate 
expenditure control. At the same time, NPM reduces the capacity and legitimacy of 
many strategies adopted by the spenders, and has the potential to undermine their 
institutional base. Many budget actors who would be classified as spenders under an 
institutional analysis of their budgetary role, are being encouraged to behave as budget 
guardians. Consequently, an extensive NPM reform program is likely to change the 
balance of power within the budget system in favor of guardians and should, therefore, 
facilitate increased capacity to impose budget discipline. 
Therefore, the simple dichotomy between guardians and spenders is difficult to sustain. 
More complex relationships are emerging (e.g. three way principal, policy agency, and 
service agent under purchaser provider split) in which it is unclear who is playing which 
role in the budgetary process. In addition, many of the NPM reforms deliberately blur 
the line between institutional role and budgetary function. Increasingly, guardians will 
be called on to perform both rationing and claiming functions; with spenders required to 
ration as well as claim. In other words, new budgetary functions do not necessarily align 
with traditional institutional roles. 
Moreover, NPM reforms have the potential to redefine the areas of budgetary conflict, 
as well as the areas of agreement. Guardians are able to do more unilaterally (eg. 
negotiating contracts and establishing aggregate expenditure targets), but they must deal 
with a more fragmented (and perhaps less stable) community of spenders (especially if 
service deliverers are including in the budget process). Conflict is likely to be 
decentralized away from central budget agencies – with former spenders acting as 
guardians over detailed expenditure allocations. Multi-year budgets are likely to result 
in more intense budgetary conflict despite negotiations occurring less often. The longer-
term impact of NPM reforms on budgetary politics will not become evident until 
regularized patterns can be identified and the more complex relationships become 
clearer. 
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The impact on budgetary politics in specific jurisdictions will vary according to 
numerous factors, not the least of which are the specific NPM reforms that are 
implemented and the detailed design of those reforms. As mentioned in the previous 
sections, individual nations have pursued the NPM reform agenda with different 
degrees of vigour, against different institutional and historical backgrounds, and with a 
considerable level of national variation. Determining whether our initial findings hold in 
any one country or the extent to which they can be generalized will require considerably 
more research. 
Are Wildavsky’s Guardians and Spenders still relevant? 
What does our research suggest for the continued relevance of Wildavsky’s guardians 
and spenders? Firstly, it demonstrates the continued relevance of this framework. It 
provides a useful analytical framework for studying budgetary reforms almost 40 years 
after its development. Its shows that the guardian-spender framework provides a 
diagnostic methodology for evaluating the impact of NPM on relations between budget 
actors; and a means of identifying potential imbalances in a country’s budgetary system. 
However, the above suggests that the definitional basis of Wildavsky’s model of 
budgetary politics is under challenge from the NPM reforms. Wildavsky’s definition of 
budgetary roles was always inexact: but we know that it accorded with both the 
institutional position of budgetary actors and could vary according to budgetary 
systems.
2
 The breadth of these classifications allowed analyses of budgetary politics to 
remain grounded, and placed functional rather than institutional equivalence at the heart 
of any comparative analysis. 
We suggest an expanded classification that differentiates between the individual budget 
actors institutional role (Wildavsky), and the function(s) they perform in budgetary 
negotiations (Schick 1990; 1994). Distinguishing between role and function should 
facilitate analysis of budgetary politics at a number of levels. It provides more 
flexibility in classifying the position of budget actors in the budget process. It suggests 
that some actors may perform multiple functions in a single stage of the budgetary 
process (e.g., a central budget agency may simultaneously claim and ration during 
budget formulation); or perform different functions at various stages in budget decision 
making (claim during budget formulation but ration during implementation of the 
budgetary year). It also allows for the possibility that while an actor’s institutional role 
may remain constant, its budgetary functions may change over time.
3
 Finally, the 
distinction enables identification of asymmetry between the institutional role of budget 
actors, and the functions they are required to perform in the budget process. While such 
asymmetry may be the deliberate consequence of reform (as in NPM), we believe it is 
valuable to be able to identify any likely disjuncture between the function a public 
servant is asked to perform and the incentive or culture associated with their 
institutional position. 
Conclusions: NPM and the Problems of Surplus Budgeting 
NPM reforms gained ascendancy during a particular historical context in which 
governments were wrestling with problems of restraining growth in government 
spending, reducing budget deficits and cutting debt (Hood, 1991; Wright, 1979; Hood, 
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and Wright, 1981). This drive for fiscal discipline created an environment that required 
new budgetary methods that strengthened guardians, imposed fiscal limits, and 
amended the incentive structures shaping bureaucratic behavior. This context clearly 
dovetailed with the NPM paradigm’s emphasis on ‘economy and parsimony’ (Hood, 
1991). NPM reforms contributed to the search for fiscal discipline and budgetary 
restraint by empowering guardians of the public purse and seeking to ingrain values of 
the ‘bottom-line’. In other words, by shifting the balance of power in the budgetary 
system, NPM reforms contributed to the capacity of governments to budget in an era of 
restraint. 
More recently, however, governments around the world are recording budget surpluses 
year-on-year, and significantly lower levels of debt (some of which may be directly 
related to NPM reforms). This development raises questions about whether the 
mechanisms that helped restrict spending are appropriate or efficacious in an era of 
surplus. The focus of budget debates has begun to shift from how to cut government 
debt and deficits, to how to manage and what to do with the budget surpluses (Posner 
and Gordon 1999; OECD 1999). Any relaxation in the impetus for immediate 
expenditure restraint is likely to shift the relationship between budget actors by:  
• challenging or eroding the strategic position gained by guardians via aggregate 
expenditure controls;  
• require more priority-setting (allocative or rationing) decisions to be 
undertaken on a policy basis; and  
• legitimize spender arguments for broader inclusion in the budget process. 
Paradoxically, having now delivered surpluses the dominant position enjoyed by 
guardians will come under challenge and their ability to control aggregate expenditure is 
likely to be eroded. New priorities can ostensibly be afforded and governments may be 
forced by political pressure to relax their previous patterns of stringent rationing. Even 
relatively small policy-driven increases in spending will soon wipe out the relatively 
small budget surpluses recorded to date. 
Table 2 suggests some of the budget policy options available to governments in this 
new budgeting environment, and their implications for the budgetary politics.
4
 While 
spending is the clear alternative to saving annual budget surpluses, expenditure can be 
targeted toward different strategies, each of which has implications for the 
government’s future fiscal capacity and budgetary politics. No one option is mutually 
exclusive and some countries are adopting more than one alternative. Yet, the survey in 
our table suggests that each option produces quite different political dynamics and 
imposes different requirements on budget actors. Delivering the desired options of a 
particular government is likely to require further changes in the budgetary system and 
may shift the balance of power in budgetary politics. 
Given the findings of our research it is likely that the new budgetary environment will 
reveal diminished capacity in those budgetary actors operating as spenders-claimants. 
Following the logic of both Schick and Wildavsky, we expect the difficulties of 
budgeting in this new ‘surplus environment’ will result in either improvizational or ad 
hoc budgeting, or produce renewed impetus for budgetary reforms that redress the any 
imbalance between budget spenders and guardians.  
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Table 2: Strategies and Options for Continuing Budget Surpluses 





A conservative and inactive option in which surpluses are 
retained as an accumulated financial asset base of the 
government, but not otherwise utilized. Assets in the liquid 
reserve are credited against gross debt for calculating 
lower net debt. There are implicit costs of interest foregone 
if not utilized and potential erosion of the value of the 
reserve by inflation. 
This option is usually not considered preferable in modern 
economies. 












Surpluses can be accumulated for lending to the public or 
private sector. Government acts as a banker, potentially 
utilising the government’s ability to borrow at lower rates 
than commercial borrowers. This option can impact on 
private capital markets and can be exploitative of tax 
payers. The financial asset base is also counted against 
gross debt for lower net debt. However, the asset base size 
and its easy liquidity can produce pressure for one-off 
grants to spending departments. 
The option is unlikely to work indefinitely. The purpose of 
accumulating surpluses will not necessarily be apparent. 
Perhaps the option is only suitable for simple economies or 
where governments can extract rents from a resource. 











Debt principal is progressively retired by governments 
paying down from each surplus. This is a conservative, 
financially risk-free option. Most appropriate when debt 
levels and interest rates are high. Can be used to reduce 
conflict between guardians and spenders if additional funds 
are released as lower interest payments are required. 
Surpluses can be disguised or technically avoided by 
calculating an amount for debt retirement within the annual 
budget as an expenditure item. Alternatively the surplus can 
be declared and debt paid down after the budget year. 
Available to complex economies but probably only over 
the medium-term and subject to the economic cycle. 
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Tax reductions can be used as an electoral incentive or to 
reduce the size of government. Political/economic 
decisions can be made on the intended purpose, nature, 
extent and life-span of tax reductions. However, changes 
to taxation will have uncertain expansionary or 
contractionary macro-economic impacts depending upon 
reaction of corporate and consumer sectors (i.e. balance 
between private savings and private expenditure). There 
will also be greater pressure on budgets as the available 
surpluses decrease. 
Consequently not risk-free in either electoral or economic 
terms. Note that tax reductions can be illusory given the 










Increased expenditures can be presented as a dividend for 
past parsimony. Governments can re-prioritize their outlays 
and the promise of future expenditures may be electorally 
appealing (and constitute an incentive for governments 
deciding on current expenditure cuts). 
There will be immediate pressure on the size of the surplus 
and perhaps pressure on maintaining new recurrent 
allocations. Additional spending will increase the size of 
government. Will also have uncertain expansionary or 
contractionary macro-economic impacts depending upon 
the use of funds and market reactions.  
Although appearing benevolent, the option poses some 
electoral and economic risks. Requires a capacity to ration 
requests for new expenditures on policy benefits vs. loss of 
surplus criteria, otherwise previous pattern is re-
established. 

















Guardian agencies provide incentives to enable spending 
and delivery agencies to ‘pay their way’ and reduce their 
dependence on general revenue (i.e. increase their future 
ability to make income-generating investment expenditure 
and/or reducing labor and other cost-cutting efficiencies). 
In Australia ‘resource agreements’ provided additional 
resources to reduce the long-term dependence on the 
budget for resources. But, spending agencies have the 
incentive and ability to disguise recurrent costs as 
investment expenditure if resource agreement monitoring 
is not effective. 
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Many OECD nations have shown remarkable capacities to impose fiscal restraint and 
create budget surpluses. Success has been achieved by a combination of political will, a 
disciplined bureaucracy and electoral acceptance. Arguably, some governments have 
managed this process while addressing issues of equality of sacrifice and providing 
partial forms of compensation for austerity measures. This discipline, however, has in 
turn produced an emerging orthodoxy that views budget surpluses as the prime 
objective of government policy, as opposed to one of its outcomes. Such surpluses are 
delivered to enhance the confidence of the financial markets in government 
performance. How governments manage and dispense their surpluses will not only 
impact on the winners and losers in society, but often will determine the survival of the 
government itself. To remain in office governments have shown they are increasingly 
prepared to lock themselves into restrictive fiscal strategies that will further constrain 




                                                 
1
 The simple two-player game depicted in Wildavsky’s spender-guardian dichotomy has 
enabled collective choice theorists to analyze budgetary politics using a two-player 
prisoner’s dilemma that broadly accords with Niskanen’s bureau-sponsor model of the 
budgetary process.  The main difference between these two models results from the 
respective models of human behavior that underpin each (see Wildavsky (1974:189-94) 
for Wildavsky’s comments on ‘political rationality’). 
2
 Wildavsky used the terms ‘spender’ and ‘guardian’ quite loosely in his writings. 
Participants are variously classified as ‘guardians’. ‘reviewers’, ‘cutters’ or ‘savers’; and 
as either ‘advocates’ and ‘spenders’. In his collaborative work with Davis et. al. (1966), 
Wildavsky dismissed the differentiation between these categories completely 
3
 We hypothesise that the institutional roles are likely to remain relatively constant over 
time, while the function(s) performed by budget actors can and will change. Validating 
this hypothesis requires further research. 
4
 Extracted from Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2001) Managing Public Expenditure in 
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